Walzer, Citizenship, Globalization And Global Public Goods


Jeramy Townsley

Dec 2004


The international community today is a place of questionably applied ideals of justice. From an optimistic point of view, it would seem that all nations have some form of justice-seeking goals as part of their Constitutions, or at least do not promote conscious efforts espousing what they believe to be injustice. Issues such as promotion of human capabilities, distribution of goods and fair treatment of all persons seem to be important components of justice. It is one thing to ask the question of how groups or nations can promote justice to their own members and their immediate neighbors. It is even more complex to ask how global justice is to be attained and what it might look like.

This paper will explore three separate and distinct issues and attempt to put them in dialogue with each other. The first issue is Michael Walzer’s discussion of membership and citizenship inSpheres of Justice,[1] specifically in how he applies these concepts (membership and citizenship) to the distribution of the social goods of welfare and security. The second issue is the discussion of globalization that is occurring today in international politics, with specific reference to how Walzer’s ideas might be applied to the global community. The third issue is a brief discussion of how the recent work on the topic of Global Public Goods can be applied to tie together these discussions.


The topic of justice is an important concern in many of Michael Walzer’s writings. InSpheres of Justicehe discusses his vision of how the existence of, and even institutionalization of plurality can still lead to equality. His unique contribution in this book is an analysis of how justice can be applied differentially in the various modes, or “spheres”, of human social activity, such as citizenship/membership, education, welfare/security and labor. His goal is to show that a simple equality, where every person has the same amount of goods, may not be the best paradigm for equality since it would require a constant process of redistributing wealth.[2] Rather, a complex equality seems more appropriate to Walzer, where success in one sphere of a person’s life, such as “office”, would not automatically convert to success (or excess) in another sphere, such as leisure time.[3]

Adding this layer of social complexity to the existing social structure and thus preventing interconvertability of success in the respective aspects of cultural life would prevent domination and tyranny by people and groups who have superior skills in any particular sphere(s). For example, he proposes that it is an unjust system when wealth necessarily grants the possessor better access to healthcare than the one who has little access to a disposable income. His basis for this proposal is his understanding of our culture’s shared beliefs about healthcare: that medicine, whether preventative or rehabilitative, are important social goods that should be made available to all people regardless of income or status.[4]

Walzer makes the claim that “the primary good that we distribute to one another is membership in some human community. … Men and women without membership anywhere are stateless persons.”[5] His purpose in focusing on membership is that he hopes to show that without membership, there can be no “hope to share in all the other social goods—security, wealth, honor, office, and power—that communal life makes possible,”[6] and further clarifies that “the theory of distributive justice begins, then, with an account of membership rights”. Thus, he begins his effort at proposing a system of justice by constructing a solid foundation for membership. After doing this, he builds on this foundation the complex equality of what he believes to be a just distribution of goods and services.

From his use of the term “stateless” in the previous quote, which comes at the very beginning of the chapter, it seems clear that his discussion will be focused on membership in a political community (astate), which he affirms by specifying that membership determines from whom obedience can be required and taxes collected, and to whom goods and services should be allocated.[7] In addition to his focus on a political community, he specifies that he is talking about a nation-state based on the control of a certain territory, not a political community based on ideological or ethnic ties. The nation-states on which he bases his argument seem to be modeled primarily by the states found in contemporary Western societies. Building on the foundations he made earlier in his text, Walzer provides a defense for his argument for relatively closed borders for states,[8] as well as limiting the distribution of goods and services to non-members.

He then explores the analogies between various levels of the state and three other common associations: neighborhoods, clubs and families.[9] He does this, in part, to create the picture of the strong bond embedded between the people living in any given state. With neighborhoods, clubs and families, there is almost always some degree of homogeneity and commonality that binds the members together. If Walzer can successfully link the state to the idea of a fairly homogeneous population of members, it will strengthen his case that the state has a reason to regulate its borders closely. As a communitarian, Walzer is concerned to protect the distinctiveness of each culture and ties this value to the need to control immigration.[10] His analogy of the state to neighborhoods, clubs and families uncovers the dissimilarities between them, especially the porosity of their respective borders. Bader notes, regarding these latter three types of associations, that they are “warm, horizontal [communities] … based on consent” whereas states are “cold vertical institutions, based not on free entry but on enforced membership and physical violence. Strictly speaking, [states] are not associations at all, but institutions.”[11]


Walzer links citizenship to territory.[12] This is an inevitable linkage, since he discusses citizenship solely in the context of the nation-state, which inherently requires a claim on territory. The idea of citizenship itself radically shifted after the French Revolution, when allegiance shifted from being a member of a community to being a member of a State.[13] Simone Weil elaborates, saying that

even the word nation had changed its meaning. In our day, it no longer denotes the sovereign people, but the sum total of peoples recognizing the authority of the same State; it is the political structure created by a State and the country under its control. When one talks about national sovereignty nowadays, all it really means is the sovereignty of the State.[14]

Williams reads a similar perspective into Hannah Arendt. He elaborates on Arendt’s dismay that modern society has become increasingly anti-political, if politics is seen through the ancient Greek lens of “politics where humans as public individuals engage with one another as active political agents, taking responsibility for themselves and for their political conditions,” as in the Agora.[15] Instead, modern politics has become institutionalized, bureaucratic and efficiency-oriented. After the responsibility for politics was shifted to the State and to professional politicians, the goal of politics seems to have become a way to free us from the need of politics. Bringing this perspective back to the issue at hand, through Arendt, Williams sees that citizenship is linked back to a bureaucratic and “anti-political” State and not to an ideological community of actors, engaging each other in citizenship.

The examples of Weil and Arendt indicate that the linking of citizenship to territory is not necessarily the oldest form of citizenship, but merely a modern expression of citizenship. In fact, it would take only a slight modification of the territorial form of citizenship to become simply a neo-feudalism.[16] Since Walzer himself places membership at the center of his program, if linking citizenship to territory turns out to be a faulty paradigm, then it is possible that the foundations for Walzer’s program rest on questionable assumptions, an issue to which we will return shortly.

Walzer briefly discusses the state, citizenship and territoriality inJust and Unjust Wars,[17] where he clearly shows his communitarian, or at least social contract roots. The following lengthy quote is found in the section on “The Rights of Political Communities.” The context he is describing is the implicit contract that members of a state have with each other and the subsequent rights and responsibilities that accord with that contract. From this perspective, we can see a very brief overview of his ideas on popular consent, citizenship, the rights of states (and subsequently citizens) and how these relate to territoriality:

The rights of states rest on the consent of their members. … The moral standing of any particular state depends upon the reality of the common life it protects and the extent to which the sacrifices required by that protection are willingly accepted and thought worthwhile. If no common life exists, or if the state doesn’t defend the common life that does exist, its own defense may have no moral justification. But most states do stand guard over the community of their citizens, at least to some degree: that is why we assume the justice of their defensive wars. … It might also be said that a people can defend its country in the same way as men and women can defend their own homes, for the country is collectively as the homes are privately owned. The right to territory might be derived, that is, from the individual right to property. But the ownership of vast reaches of land is highly problematic, I think, unless it can be tied in some plausible way to the requirements of national survival and political independence. And these two seem by themselves to generate territorial rights that have little to do with ownership in the strict sense.[18]

One place to begin an analysis of Walzer’s proposal of the territoriality of citizenship is the difference in terminology of citizenship and membership. In ordinary language, the difference between the two terms is fairly clear, membership being a much more broad and non-technical term. In readingSpheres of Justice, one might initially presume that Walzer is thinking in terms of a broad membership as his foundation rather than true citizenship. This might especially be the case since he brings in the categories of neighborhoods, clubs and families. However, a careful read of the text quickly disabuses one of that presumption.

First, Walzer clearly links his usage of the term membership to a territory and to the state and calls this relationship citizenship.[19] Second, he further insists that membership in a state is a necessary and sufficient cause for that state to therefore distribute social goods to that member, such as welfare and security.[20] Third, he makes a clear distinction between members and resident non-members, such as refugees, guest workers and other immigrants. Walzer makes a point that resident non-members have rights to a limited amount of goods and services, if for no other reason than that they now find themselves on the territory of a different state where they would be unable to otherwise provide for themselves. He utilizes the analogy of the Good Samaritan story as support for this position.[21] He also indicates the importance of granting such resident non-members some means of obtaining citizenship. But beyond the borders of one’s territory, there is little inSpheres of Justiceto indicate an obligation for the state to provide significant levels of goods and services to other types of non-members.[22]

While Walzer links citizenship to territory, this has not always been the usage of the term. There are several ways of thinking about citizenship. Turner explores one understanding of citizenship as described by Marshall just after World War II. Marshall, looking at 1950’s England, described three components of citizenship: civil, political and social.

The civil component was necessary for the achievement of individual freedoms and included such elements as freedom of speech, the right to own property and the right to justice. The political element was constituted by the rights to participate in the exercise of political power, in particular the rights to free elections and a secret ballot. Finally, Marshall defined the social component as the right to ‘a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being’.[23]

Two things are interesting about Turner’s analysis of Marshall’s paradigm. First, he describes how Marshall separates the social citizenship component into three further sub-divisions, representing the limited ways that welfare and security were distributed to citizens in the form of entitlements and desert: work, war and reproduction. As laborers, citizens were given insurance, health benefits and retirement, in addition to earning wages. As soldiers, citizens were given provisions such as housing, pay and pension among other benefits. As reproducers, biological builders of the nation, citizens received entitlements such as education and healthcare for their children, the social benefits of family, caretakers as the parents aged, and some financial support for unwed mothers.[24] Turner specifically notes that Marshall’s analysis indicates these entitlements acted as “State distributed buffers” against the capitalist system by a redistribution of goods to these working, serving and reproducing citizens.

The second interesting component to Turner’s analysis is his updating of Marshall’s categories. He notes that Marshall’s original categories of entitlement have seriously eroded.[25] He says, “The old causal mechanisms of Marshallian citizenship – class conflict and mobilization for warfare – have been replaced by new causal processes that are more closely connected with social movements, status contradictions and identity.”[26] He claims the new processes for citizenship have been brought about by a newly established global awareness. In particular, he points out the importance of the development of certain problems that cannot be solved by the old methods of conflict, such as the global AIDS pandemic, global warming, the threat of nuclear holocaust, and the growing awareness of many types of international human rights abuses, each of which can only be solved by multinational cooperation and voluntary civic mechanisms.

The social citizenship responses to these global problems, as Turner describes them, grant entitlements different from those originally proposed by Marshall, but are still important: environmental entitlements, aboriginal entitlements[27] and cultural entitlements[28] . It is noteworthy, in the context of the application to Walzer’s linking of citizenship to territory, that none of the entitlements that are sought are inherently linked to the nation-state to which the citizen belongs. Rather, they are broader entitlements that have a global benefit in mind, not simply local communal and familial benefits, though these associations will certainly benefit as well.

Omar Dahbour provides a second way of looking at citizenship that relies on several recent conceptual developments. The first is what he calls “the anarchist-libertarian conception of ‘open borders,’ in which the attempt to specify limiting or exclusionary conceptions of membership is completely rejected.”[29] The second is a Habermasian formulation of “constitutional patriotism—that is the specification of citizenship on the basis of adherence to principles, rather than on the basis of the ascription of (national) identities.” Finally, Dahbour describes Kymlicka’s position of “multicultural citizenship [which is the] idea that internal differentiation of states into subcultural groups with distinct rights but with a common citizenship allows greater scope for cultural survival and group self-determination.”[30] He asks what type of community the nation-state is, asking questions such as whether the need for internal homogeneity poses threats to internal critiques, and whether national identity is tied to political action.

In any case, this discussion of citizenship shows that Walzer’s proposal of linking citizenship to territory, and therefore, establishing the necessity of the nation-state for entitlement may not be the best option available. It certainly is not the only option. Further, Walzer gives few (if any) concrete recommendations as to what a state owes to non-members who are outside the territorial borders. As mentioned before, Walzer does describe situations where states should provide aid to non-members. However, he states it in purely theoretical and general terms. He emphasizes the ambiguity inherent in his formulation when he says, “What precisely they owe one another is by no means clear, but we commonly say of such cases that positive assistance is required if (1) it is needed or urgently needed by one of the parties; and (2) if the risks and costs of giving it are relatively low for the other party.”[31] Such broad guidelines are reminiscent of his distinction between thick and thin morality, with this particular description of mutual aid being a minimal guideline. However, this does little to provide a systematic or global treatment on non-member aid, a question that Walzer leaves unanswered.

In the chapter on “Security and Welfare”, he presses further the issue that the state is expected to provide for its citizens based on need.[32] But again, he does not say what a state should do for the non-resident, if anything, other than a passing reference to the story of the Good Samaritan.[33] Here he affirms that if we are confronted with an injured non-resident that we are obligated to help that person, regardless of membership. He extends this, by making his position clear, that states that are ableshouldadmit refugees, thus in the process making them residents[34] and perhaps eventually into citizens.

But in the end, in terms of global justice, it seems that Walzer leaves us with an abbreviated public policy, one that has few concrete obligations to help those outside of our own borders, especially since Walzer seems to leave little room for non-territorial members. Given that Walzer ties the political community to the territory,[35] Walzer makes explicit this exclusivity when he explains, “Membership is important because of what the members of a political community owe to one another and to no one else, or to no one else in the same degree” (64).

Welfare and Security

Regardless of Walzer’s lack of a systematic proposal for aid to non-residents, the fact remains that many states do provide aid to non-residents outside of their borders. Whether through the United Nations, NGO’s or through direct support, many nations engage in various activities designed to benefit the welfare of citizens of other nations. Sometimes this aid comes in the form of food, medical support and reconstruction efforts. Other times this aid comes in the form of military protection from invading countries. Whatever form this aid takes, the sovereign nation-states of the world frequently sacrifice their own resources for the benefit of other nation-states, typically either in the defense of a political or economic ally, or simply in the name of humanitarian rescue (which falls under the general category that Walzer establishes of mutual aid).

These redistributions of goods and services from one nation-state to other nation-states are neither regulated nor required, except perhaps in the case where treaties exist between individual countries. Even these, however, are non-enforceable contracts. In a recent article Walzer refers to the current global environment as “one step from anarchy”[36] according to a continuum of seven possible arrangements ranging from a “unified global state” to “international anarchy.”[37] In this arrangement,

Global organizations are weak; their decision mechanisms are uncertain and slow; their powers of enforcement are difficult to bring to bear and, at best, only partially effective. Warfare between or among states has been reduced, but overall violence has not been reduced. There are many weak states in the world today and the global regime has not been successful in preventing civil wars, military interventions, savage repression or political enemies, massacres and ‘ethnic cleansing’ aimed at minority populations. Nor has global inequality been reduced, even though the flow of capital across borders (labour mobility too, I think) is easier than it has ever been.[38]

Recognizing many of the most crucial problems facing humanity at the global level, Walzer proposes that we move towards the center of this anarchy-unification continuum, landing just a bit on the “unification side” of the center. This would basically keep us at the current state of international anarchy, but “mitigated and controlled by a threefold set of nonstate agents: organizations like the UN, the associations of international civil society, and also regional unions like the European Community.”[39] The last of these three represents a series of regional federations across the globe, uniting regions in themselves, as well as with each other, since federations of overlapping memberships might exist. These three non-state agents, with which we are familiar even in the anarchic international environment in which we find ourselves today, would be much stronger than they currently are, yet still leaving each state with its own sovereignty.

Despite the clarification of his recognition of the need for countries to work together and to engage in mutual support, Walzer does not give any justification or clarification of his position in light of his views on membership as described inSpheres of Justice. While he does not deny countries the right to provide aid to non-citizens, he also gives no systematized perspective that countries “should” provide aid to other states. Certainly he does not provide guidelines for how such an endeavor should be undertaken or under what specific circumstances aid should be provided. A helpful addition to Walzer’s proposal, when constructing his defense of “pluralism and equality” in the context of how goods and services should be justly distributed in such a system, would have been a discussion of how that system fits into the larger context of global injustice and violence.

So where Walzer leaves us, is with profound tools to think about potentially better ways to distribute goods and services within one’s national borders and to other citizens. He also gives strong opinion to joining the concept of citizenship to territory. But what he fails to address is a systematized perspective on how and when goods and services should be provided to other states, or to defend his position on citizenship and territoriality against other types of citizenship--types that are perhaps more amenable to better distributions of global justice and peace. Given the impact that globalization is having on how states undertake foreign and domestic policy, an exploration of the concept of globalization is important if one is going to ask questions of global justice. Once globalization as a concept is better understood, then one can see if the tools Walzer provides to us can be applied at this much larger scale.


There are many different paradigms through which to understand globalization. We have already seen Walzer’s proposal—a seven-step continuum from international anarchy to a globally unified state, where he would like to see us just off center towards the side of unification. Another common dichotomy is Republicanism versus Cosmopolitanism. Again, both of these represent extreme ends on a continuum. Those who support some form of Cosmopolitanism, like Habermas, Kant[40] ,[41] and Kymlicka,[42] try to imagine a world order where the states have more fluid boundaries, where individuals see themselves as having citizenship in the global community (possibly at the same time as local citizenship), and where there are several, strong international organizations that can limit an individual nation-state’s sovereignty. Those who support Republicanism, usually tending towards the communitarians, emphasize the good of the sovereignty of the State, and the particularity and solidarity of its citizens.

Critique of Cosmopolitanism

On both ends of these dichotomies there are critiques of the other side. On the Republican side, one of the concerns about Cosmopolitanism is about open borders. There are a number of justice issues that arise for citizens when borders are poorly regulated:

overwhelming numbers of migrants and refugees ("flood"); public order problems; unemployment and ethnic segmentation of labor markets; stress or break-down of the social security systems; serious overload of public social services (education, housing, health, transportation, etc.); serious political effects (welfare backlash, xenophobia, racism, and Immigrant fundamentalism); culturalUberfremdung(alienation).[43]

Another issue that can arise with Cosmopolitanism is that the community will risk losing its cultural identity. This charge is a common critique by the communitarians, who value the history and distinctiveness ofthe community. MacIntyre, as an example, is concerned with the “flourishing of humanly worthwhile practices and the virtues and excellences that they bring into play, and he is interested in communities insofar as they provide sites for these practices and virtues (and for no other reason).”[44] Another concern of the Republican is that there will be a loss of political sovereignty and thus a loss of self-determination and security. It has been shown that the increase in globalization has the effect on some nation-states of weakening their sovereignty.[45]

There are a series of other issues that Republicans can raise for the Cosmopolitan as described by Beitz,[46] which are especially pressing for global issues of justice for underdeveloped nations. First, multinational business frequently exploits workers in underdeveloped nations. Since the businesses themselves, absent any input from the sellers, tend to set prices for goods, it is the multinational businesses that profit while the situation of the workers may continue to get worse. Frequently the wealthy countries have more power, both in enforcement of their position as well as the bargaining power to go to other sellers. The exploited workers may have little recourse.

A second problem is that

the world economy has evolved its own financial and monetary institutions that set exchange rates, regulate the money supply, influence capital flows, and enforce rules of international economic conduct. The system of interdependence imposes burdens on poor and economically weak countries that they cannot practically avoid. Industrial economies have become reliant on raw materials that can only be obtained in sufficient quantities from developing countries. In the present structure of world prices, poor countries are often forced by adverse balances of payments to sell resources to more wealthy countries when those resources could be more efficiently used to promote development of the poor countries' domestic economies. ' Also, private foreign investment imposes on poor countries patterns of political and economic development that may not be optimal from the point of view of the poor countries themselves. Participation in the global economy on the only terms available involves a loss of political autonomy.[47]

Thus the problem can arise of the exploitation of workers, not just by the businesses themselves, but by the capitalist system that couches all of the transactions.

A third problem is that the “global monetary system allows disturbances (e.g. price inflation) in some national economies to be exported to others that may be less able to cope with their potentially disastrous effects.”[48] Each of these three problems is based out of Cosmopolitanism where there is economic interdependence between nations of asymmetrical power. Because of this interdependence, the weaker country’s involvement in the transactions may become non-voluntary, again, because they may have no bargaining power and no recourse from their exploitation. Walzer’s proposal of preventing interconvertability between spheres, if it were applied to these particular nations, might very well solve this issue, since it seems clearly to be a case of domination through converting power and flexibility into monetary profit by the exploitation of a weaker state.

Critique of Republicanism

Critiques can also be lodged against the Republican side of the spectrum. First, from a realist perspective, the classical paradigms that used to characterize the relatively anarchist international structure no longer exist to the degree that they did a century ago, or even fifty years ago. Large international regulatory agencies, such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the International Court, and many other such organizations have revolutionized the way nation-states deal with one another. The success of economic and political globalization, as well as the interdependence of states leads to questions about the validity of some of the assumptions behind Republican theory and international law.[49]

First, the assertion by the Republican that states can be truly sovereign, is questioned by the Cosmopolitan. It is difficult to imagine that any state in the contemporary world could have an uncompromised sovereignty over its peoples and land. Republicanism needs to grapple with the radical interdependence found in current international relations, especially in the area of economics, but also politics, security and environmental issues (note the issues that Turner raises above in his analysis of global citizenship).

Second, another assumption that must be questioned is whether there can be a clear separation between domestic and foreign policy. Within more classical forms of international relations the dichotomy between goods and services provided to citizens versus the security and trade issues with foreign countries was fairly clear. The separation was not difficult to establish and the two did not need to have significant interaction. However, such is no longer the case. Again, given the economic and financial interdependence of the individual nation-states on the situation of the global economy, and more specifically, on the economic situation of those countries with which it engages in the most crucial trade, it becomes clear that a nation’s internal economic and social policies must take account of the trends that are occurring outside of the state in the international arena.

For example, many African nations are facing terrible devastation due to the massive infection of their population with HIV, which at first examination appears to be a domestic issue. But the leaders of those countries must be able to negotiate various deals with Western pharmaceutical companies to get low-cost anti-viral medications into their countries. The success of those negotiations frequently involves delicate foreign policy issues since the pharmaceutical companies would have to offer the drugs to such countries at a price much lower than they would offer them in Western countries. Additionally, the national destabilization that faces the hardest hit of the African countries has been recognized to threaten international security, thus forcing non-African countries to consider the potentially devastating ramifications to themselves ofnotproviding assistance to these countries.

Thus domestic and foreign policy are being intricately bound together in the globalized world. This poses a problem for pure Republicanism, in that way they construct domestic policy may in fact have to be coordinated with other states in order to accommodate global issues. International health crises, local political instability that breeds international terrorism, and domestic environmental and safety regulations that can affect global pollution all contribute to ways a nation may have to guide domestic policy in light of the needs of other countries and global justice.

A third critique focuses on the issues of global justice, not dissimilar to the citizenship-linked entitlements mentioned above by Turner. In this sense, the issues at stake are global—environmental catastrophe, human rights abuses and AIDS being some of the prototypical examples. The individual, sovereign nation-state cannot deal effectively with any of these issues. The causes are too complex and dispersed to be resolved by anything other than a concerted effort from a majority of states who are willing to give up at least some of their sovereignty in order to sustain and distribute other goods—both to its citizens as well as non-members who may live in other, similarly affected countries.

Further, the issue of human-rights abuses seems so unanimously offensive to contemporary ethical systems, that to resolutely claim that it is inappropriate to interfere in a state’s sovereignty to protect human lives and dignity, is to undermine the validity of core foundational values of Republicanism—the self-determination and value of all persons, including those living in another sovereign state. Walzer defends the importance of self-determination inThick and Thin, when he discusses the issue of protecting the “rights” of each culture to exist and govern themselves.[50]

A fourth critique of Republicanism involves our recent historical experience with nationalism leading to violent aggressions against neighboring states, or internal massacres of those residents who are not full-citizens due to immigration or other qualities that appear to devalue the blood purity of the nation or weaken allegiance.[51] Granted, though Republicanism is not identical to nationalism, there are, however, strong ties between the two. One cannot be an advocate for nationalism, yet at the same time wish for stronger international agencies that would weaken the sovereignty of the state. Martha Nussbaum proposes a similar critique of Republicanism, based on the idea of nationalism:

Martha Nussbaum asserts that the institutionalization of the sovereign state has produced an irrational view of particular interests as ethical. “One of the greatest barriers to rational deliberation in politics,” she notes, “is the unexamined feeling that one’s own preferences and ways are neutral and natural. An education that takes national boundaries as morally salient too often reinforces this kind of irrationality, by lending to what is an accident of history a false air of moral weight and glory.” … State sovereignty is thus the product of particularist designs that are, at their core, morally bankrupt.[52]


Walzer on Globalization

Walzer’s answer to this problem, as described above, situates the international arena between international anarchy and the globally unified state, on the “unified side” of the center. Thus he seeks to gain the best of both worlds, while presumably avoiding many of the problems found at the extreme ends. The list of criteria he uses to test his models are “their capacity to promote peace, distributive justice, cultural pluralism, and individual freedom.”[53] He believes that the anarchy position “leads regularly to war,” and that “sovereign states negotiate with each other on the basis of their ‘national interests’, reach agreements, and sign treaties, but the treaties are not enforceable by any third party.”[54]

In contrast,

warfare as we know it would be impossible in a radically centralized global regime, for none of the motives for going to war would any longer operate: ethnic and religious differences, and divergent national interests, indeed, every kind of sectional interest, would simply cease to exist.[55]

In addition to dramatically reducing violence, Walzer also believes that such a globalized state would function better in distributing goods: “But we can generalize from the history of centralized states and suggest that global distributive justice might be better served by a strong government that was able to mobilize resources from, and apportion them among, all the countries and regions of the world.”[56] However, he also recognizes the danger of tyranny from such a highly centralized state, as well as the potential for particular cultures and diversity to be radically privatized.[57] Thus he does not seem to want to adopt this model, instead opting for a more central model that, while not having the distributive and peace-promoting benefits as the unified model, at least does not carry such a strong threat of tyranny.

Bringing together the discussions of citizenship and globalization, there are several options that can inform Walzer’s project of international justice. First, the existence of multilayered citizenship is not unknown, as well as multilayered and nested citizenship, as found currently in the European Union.[58] As discussed in relationship to both Turner and Dahbour, there are different types of citizenship. “Political citizenship is complemented by economic, industrial and social citizenship (many spheres of citizenship), and political citizenship is gaining importance on different, increasingly suprastate levels of political integration (many levels of political citizenship).”[59] In increased migration and interdependence of nation-states, Bader proposes that these are causing a disentanglement of citizenship from “ethnicity, culture and nationhood”. Not that this is eroding membership, in Walzer’s sense, but rather, it is merely shifting the emphasis on membership from territory back to a community, which may represent an ideological community.

For example, within mass social movements we see Arendt’s sense of the political, where “emergent forms of solidarity in democracies . . . are antecedent on national identities,”[60] such as the Civil Rights Movement. These associations are clearly memberships, and their work together, by pressuring the national hegemony, bring entitlements to the group, assuming they are successful in obtaining their goals. Similar types of associations also bring entitlements, such as Turner’s typology of new citizenships based on environmental, aboriginal and cultural entitlements. Seeking such goals are, according to Bader, “typical of transnational civil society, evident in human-rights and environmental NGO’s and other civil society organizations.”[61]

Two points are related to this. First, a slight modification to the definition of the polity might be helpful:

a politically organized society or community with its own institutions for making collectively binding decisions for a specified group of persons and/or within a bounded territory. This definition does not imply core features of modern statehood such as a territorial monopoly of violence or external sovereignty in an international system of polities of the same type.[62]

Built into this conception of citizenship is a richer understanding of change in the state. While the neorealist perspective sees a top-down model, where nothing short of a cataclysmic shift could cause change in the system, the pluralist perspective is one of “complex interdependence” between citizen and state.

Pluralism stressed multiple channels between states and the importance of non-state actors, the absence of a hierarchy of issues, and the low salience of force in many areas of international relations. International politics no longer necessarily revolved around security and force; political forms much closer to those characteristic of domestic politics were emerging.[63]

Bohman describes a type of citizenship that has a relationship to the state similar to that implied as necessary by Brown, Baubock, Bader and Walzer, which he calls “cosmopolitan democracy”. Bohman sees it as a middle option between Republicanism and Cosmopolitanism. Its core is a democratic politic that includes a “global public sphere, transnational civil society, and various levels of formal political and administrative institutions.”[64] It incorporates procedures that allow the citizen to participate in local decision-making, as well as politics outside of the nation-state. Bohman specifies that the goal is political equality, not distributive equality, thus allowing particular communities and nations within the cosmopolitan environment to retain some of their distinctiveness, while at the same time participating in the larger political processes.

We have seen that a middle ground can be achieved between pure Republicanism and pure Cosmopolitanism. The cosmopolitan democracy acts as but one example of how the nation-state can be rearranged to accommodate the globalization trends that most (if not all) countries are facing as they maintain and construct both domestic and foreign policy. The larger question that we started with, however, is how does one go about a just distribution of goods and services in the international arena? Is such a proposal even reasonable? Utilizing the foundational ideas of nation-states organized around a globalization outlook, one of the most promising avenues for providing global justice, is the concept of Global Public Goods.


The interest in exploring the concept of Global Public Goods (GPG) is closely interrelated to the increasing prominence of globalization. As the world becomes more interdependent[65] the international arena no longer can be segmentalized as discretely as it once had been. All of the world’s economies can be strongly affected by disruptions in any part of the globalized network that had developed, as we saw in the Southeast Asian crisis in 1997.[66] As mentioned above, the AIDS crisis in certain parts of Africa threaten to destabilize the security of many other nations.[67] Inherently tied in with the interdependent networks of economic and health interests, comes the motivation for nations to pool resources, or somehow contribute to certain critical problems in other countries.

GPG’s can be one way of providing these resources to where they are needed. They “are goods with benefits that extend to all countries, people and generations.”[68] Public goods, which will be defined in more detail later, have traditionally been things that are provided by the state, are market failures, and are used by all people in a community or state. GPG’s extend this concept to the international arena. Things like the protection of the ozone layer, respect for universal human rights, peace and security, the control of infectious diseases, the stability of global climate and stability of economic markets all represent examples of goods that can be shared by every person on the planet. Even the market itself is a global public good, since large numbers of people benefit from it, and it must be socially constructed and maintained by various actors.[69] Even banalities such as the international communications network and the international civil aviation system, which most of us take for granted today, are GPG’s that were constructed by individual groups or states and maintained rigorously to keep them active.[70] Without these interventions, the face of our world would be dramatically different.

Globalization has produced a number of effects in the contemporary world and both qualitative and quantitative measures show the increasing rate of change over the past fifty years. Kaul describes several of the most important and obvious effects that have occurred:

Most obvious is the rapid emergence of an increasingly dense web of intergovernmental organizations, international nongovernmental organizations (NGO’s), and a wide variety of other transnational pressure groups and networks. For example, at the beginning of the 20thcentury there were just 37 intergovernmental organizations and 176 NGO’s. In 1999 there were 6,415 intergovernmental organizations and 43,958 international NGO’s. … There has also been a substantial increase in the number of international treaties and international regimes, altering the situational context of states. … In remarkably little time the European Union has taken Europe from the disarray of World War II to a world where sovereignty is pooled across a growing number of areas of common concern. … Another notable trend is the growing enmeshment of public and private agencies in the making of rules, setting of codes, and establishment of standards. Many new sites of rulemaking and lawmaking have emerged, creating a multitude of “decentered law-making processes” in various areas of the global order.[71]


Returning briefly to Walzer, one of the problems that arises in his proposal for attaining justice, is that he tends to offer minimalist guidelines, to allow for local, maximal ideas in each respective community. Given the Communitarian commitment to preservation of local traditions and sovereignty, it seems reasonable for Walzer to follow this pattern. However, since he advocates for a system of international relations that is closer to the center on the anarchy-unification scale described above, it would be helpful to have specific options available to help achieve his goal. He attempts some measure of practical application inOn Toleration, where he discusses seven key elements to everyday life as they are played out in various types of international relational systems (power, class, gender, religion, education, civil religion and tolerating the intolerant).[72] However, even at this level he does more descriptive work and little normative work, which would seem to be a necessary step for pushing forward his program of just distributions.

InThick and Thin, Walzer describes the general principle of self-determination as a guideline for directing the relations between states and “tribes”. This is his attempt at formulating a useful “expression of moral minimalism in international politics,”[73] one that he hopes transcends our own limited perspective of a liberal-democratic understanding of rights. He defines self-determination as the ability of a tribe to “govern themselves (in accordance with their own political ideas)—insofar as they can decently do that, given their local entanglements.”[74] He then applies this formulation to minority groups within a larger political entity and not truly to international relations, as would be most helpful to the topic of the globalization of justice.

In bothThick and Thinas well asOn Toleration, he makes the claim that the majority should not interfere with any given minority’s rights to govern themselves and to maintain their own cultural identity. It takes little extrapolation to extend this principle to the international realm, to make the claim that no state should interfere with another’s ability to govern itself. However, this does not make much advancement in the discussion of what assistance one should offer to the neighbor, other than suggesting that if a neighbor becomes unable to sustain its self-determination, either by natural disaster or attack, that another state might feel compelled to provide assistance. But Walzer offers no institutionalized procedures for guiding or assuring this assistance, or any more specific criteria for judging when to provide assistance other than the vague term, self-determination. Further, the guideline of self-determination provides little insight into more general issues of just distribution of goods at the international level.

However, there are contemporary forces at work that are pushing the world into arenas that could lead us to greater distributions of goods. The process of globalization, discussed in theoretical terms above, is having very practical effects to most people in the Western world, and has begun to influence the average person even in underdeveloped nations. While 45% of the world still lives on less than $2 a day,[75] the various transnational organizations that are designed to stabilize the world’s economy and provide assistance to developing nations, have the potential to raise the quality of living for every one.

Part of this optimism is rooted in the ideals of neoliberalism, the primary economic philosophy of the world leadership of the 1980’s-1990’s. This neoliberalism, championed by both Reagan and Thatcher, which became the primary guiding economic policy of the World Bank, has produced unanticipated problems. For example, while the hope was that the continued stabilization of the world’s economy would raise the standard of living for the poorest people, studies have shown that the gap between the richest and the poorest has actually increased dramatically and shows few signs of decreasing.[76] Some blame this specifically on an unabashed faith in the completely free market, and even more specifically, on the World Bank, while promoting the benefits of the IMF as being more responsive to the needs of developing countries.[77]

Regardless, there are many transnational organizations that are providing economic, social, medical and technological services to a diverse spread of nations and continents. Part of this process involves determining the needs of specific locations and distributing goods or services to them. This is one of the core aspects of justice as Walzer wants to make sure is achieved. A concept that has developed to help facilitate this process is “global public goods” (GPG). As organizations and countries look at what needs to go where on the international playing field, determining what is available (goods) with what the needs are is a crucial component. Working out the concept of GPG’s may prove to be a foundational piece to this project.

The concept of “public goods” has a fairly recent history, being solidified in a seminal article by Samuelson in 1954.[78] Classically, the two components of a public good are its non-rival and non-excludable features. Non-rival refers to a product’s ability to be used by a person without detracting from it’s usability by other people. For example, air is a good that everyone can use equally without detracting from its usability by anyone else. Non-excludability refers to the fact that it would be extremely difficult to prevent other people from using that good. Broadcast signals used to be primarily non-exclusive, since it was impossible to prevent other people from receiving those signals. However, technology has changed this public good into a private good, since signals can now be scrambled and one must purchase a “descrambler” to properly receive the signal.

Another classically understood feature of a public good is that it represents a market failure. Several issues prevent them from being competitive on the market, thus making it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to make a profit from them. One of the primary issues is the “free-rider” problem. This occurs when a good is available for use, but there is little incentive to contribute to group that provides it. One example of this is shareware, when a programmer creates a piece of software, makes it available to the public, and simply asks for a donation for its use. There is little incentive for the public to contribute to the programmer, unless built-in features limit its use. Another example is the network of roads. Everyone uses the roads, but there would be little incentive to contribute to them unless a person was forced to do so, assuming the roads were already there for use. This problem has led to the establishment of specific taxes by some countries, to ensure these public goods remain available to all. This presents a related and commonly accepted feature of the public good: it is provided by the state, since the market will fail to establish it.

Still another feature of the public good is that it is susceptible to the prisoner’s dilemma[79] , caused by underprovision. Public goods are not only market failures, but they are also cooperation failures.[80] Since providing any good requires investment, and a public good is something that, by nature, most everyone would want to use, it is logical to assume that if one waits around long enough, then somebody will eventually provide the product. Since public goods are both non-excludable and non-rival, once the good has been set up, there is little to prevent everybody else from using it as well. This latter aspect is the free-rider component. The prisoner’s dilemma appears when, as each individual waits for the good to be provided by somebody else but lacks the good in the meantime, the “pursuit of self-interest makes [each individual] worse off than they would be, if they had cooperated.”[81]

In addition the classical non-rival and non-excludable criterion for International Public Goods (IPG), Sandler has proposed the understanding that “the manner in which individual contributions to the public good determine the total quantity of the good available for consumption.”[82] He calls this the aggregation technology, since it is the “relationship between individual contributions and the aggregate quantity of the public”. He discusses four specific technologies, or methods, that people use to contribute to the public good, all in terms of game theory.

The first is a summation technology, where everyone’s contribution participates equally in the quantity of goods available to everyone. One game for using this technology is the prisoner’s dilemma, where a person tries to determine the amount of her own contribution by assessing the relative cost/benefit ration of cooperating versus waiting for somebody else to provide the good. A second game under summation technology is the “chicken game”, where not only are the majority of people no better for not contributing, but they all suffer from the lack of input. For example, in the case of pollution, if no one finds solutions, everybody will live in an unhealthy environment.

A second technology he calls “weakest-link technology”, where “the smallest contribution level fixes the quantity of the public good for the entire group.”[83] The example here is the problem of river-blindness cause by a parasite in a fly. If one area fails to contain the fly, then all surrounding areas run the risk of catching the disease, no matter how much they eradicate the problem in their own areas. The third technology Sandler mentions is the “best-shot” technology, opposite from the weakest link, in which the “largest contribution of an individual sets the aggregate level of the IPG available for consumption.”[84] In this case, a discovery in the basic sciences would represent such a technology, since once the discovery is made, everybody has access to it. He specifically mentions treatments discovered for the treatment of malaria. The fourth technology he mentions is the “weighted sum”, in which “nations receive disproportionately greater benefits and thus possess a large incentive to support the IPG.”[85] An example would be the global spread of AIDS. While the United States and Europe contribute a great number of cases of AIDS to the worldwide population, the African number of cases, also quite large, is given a significantly greater weighted sum of international consequences, due to poorer conditions of education, medicine and other resources, and thus their ability to contain the spread of the disease.[86]

Sandler proposes each of these four technologies in the context of his article on how to finance GPG’s. The financing of national public goods has, for the most part, been worked out. Some cultures tax their population to the extent that healthcare is covered. Others tax just enough to provide the basic state infrastructure and protection from invasion. In other cases, communities come together to provide education where the teaching of each child by the parent would not be the most efficient solution. Sandler’s proposal is looking, however, not just at national public goods, but how goods can be distributed at the international level. Financing for such projects is much more difficult, since there is no international taxation system. But as globalization progresses, assuming it does so, new ways will have to be constructed to deal with the complexities of distributing goods to different sectors, while at the same time, as Walzer likes to emphasize, maintain the sovereignty of each country.

Since there is currently no transnational taxation system, various methods have already been used to pool resources. Some methods have been worked out, such as when the IMF or World Bank requires participating members to contribute to the pooled fund. Sandler proposes the establishment of a process of international taxation:

Two overall principles of taxation guide the financing of public goods at the national level and can be applied at the supranational level to IPGs. The benefit principle requires that the recipients of a good’s benefits pay their marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) or the value of their marginal benefit from consuming the good. If each consumer pays his or her MWTP, and if the sum of the MWTP collected is equated to the public good’s marginal cost of provision, an optimal level of a pure public good is then provided, since social benefits match social costs at the margin.... A second means for financing a public good when private alternatives are unavailable is to base the agents’ financial burden for the good on their ability to pay in terms of their income or wealth. From an administrative viewpoint, an ability-to-pay scheme does not require the government to ascertain the agents’ MWTP schedules, and, as such, is not expected to achieve an optimal provision of the public good. Efficiency is sacrificed for practical implementation.[87]

The practical negative result of such a system is that each involved state would give up some of its sovereignty and income. This might not be an insurmountable problem, however, since states currently already do this in transnational organizations such as the United Nations and the European Union.

When looking at the groups that provide public goods, one normally considers states as the primary actors. However, many transnational organizations and private corporations have taken over the role of distributing goods and services to the community of states, as well as acting as moderators between states, as they consider providing GPG’s. Two of the problems that bring up the prisoner’s dilemma when states consider cooperating to produce GPG’s is that “in international politics transactions costs are high and property rights are often poorly defined.”[88]

Keohane provides a brief analysis of the Coase Theorem[89] , and shows how it can be applied to the efficiency of international cooperation. While Keohane rejects the acceptance of a pure form of the Coase Theorem, he affirms that approximating the conditions that there must exist a “clear legal framework establishing property rights and low-cost information available in a roughly equal way to all parties—will tend to facilitate cooperative solutions.”[90] He notes that international regimes assume that in order to receive mutually beneficial outcomes in transactions and infractions, the Coasian issues of property rights and information exchange must be met. This belief, Keohane notes, is seemingly based on an inversion of the Coase Theorem, in that imagining a world without the conditions that Coase proposes, “coordination will often be thwarted by dilemmas of collective action”.

International organizations help ameliorate the prisoner’s dilemma issues by acting to increase the efficiency of the process, making cooperation more likely: “Institutions perform this function by providing information about others’ preferences, intentions, behaviour, standards of behaviour and causal knowledge. … they do not modify state interests, [but] by changing the informational environment, they change state strategies in such a way that self-interested states find it easier to cooperate reliably with one another.”[91]

Not only do institutions act to increase the likelihood that inter-state transactions will occur, but they can also directly provide resources, like the IMF and WHO. One assumption made by some analysts, such as extreme Cosmopolitans, is that the efficiency and productivity of transnational organizations will make the states-system obsolete as states wither in power, which may not be the most likely outcome of globalization.[92] Knill and Lehmkuhl provide a model in which private corporations and transnational organizations cooperate with states to make the globalization system work smoothly. They describe four ideal types that represent patterns of cooperation, each of which represent the situation where the state does not exhibit weakening of strength, yet is not the primary provider of public goods. They place these ideal types in a simple graph, as shown below. The first they call Interventionist Regulation, where “the overall responsibility for the provision of public goods lies with the state, as does the power to decide both the content of public goods and the institutional form for providing them.”[93] This method can be thought of as the “enabling” state, which either provides goods itself, or constructs the regulations and infrastructure that allows other organizations to provide goods.

Governance Capacity of Public Actors

Governance Capacity of Private Actors




Interfering Regulation

Interventionist Regulation


Private Self-Regulation

Regulated Self-Regulation

The second model is “Regulated Self-Regulation”, where there are “more cooperative patterns of interaction between public and private actors and not simply an interventionist style of regulation.”[94] The example they give here is the way that ICANN (the organization that regulates and distributes Internet domain names) works together with governments, which grant it the authority it has, to function as it does. ICANN has the capacity to govern itself and create new regulations, yet still functions under the authority of the state.

The third model is “Private Self-Regulation” where “the state actually has no capacity to directly intervene in private regulation and to provide a specific good itself … [though] states might still play a role in providing complementary governance contributions, hence ‘refining’ and guiding societal self-regulation.”[95] The example they give for this model is the Internet and property rights, where information and software is vulnerable to be conscripted by those for whom it was not intended. States have had difficulty enforcing property rights in this case, but many software companies and communities have begun to develop their own security protocols for protecting their property.

The fourth model is “Interfering Regulation”, where “public actors are no longer capable of compensating for the low potential of private governance contributions.”[96] In this case, the private sector fails to regulate the production and safety of the products they produce. So the state must regulate the processes itself, in what the authors call “policies of pinpricks”, such that many “ad hoc” regulations are patchworked together to try to maintain the flow of product, as well as safety. The example they provide here is the pornographic content of the Internet. In order to protect children from obtaining such images and information, the state, which finds it difficult to directly regulate itself “with [the Internet’s] decentralized and transjurisdictional character”, imposes both binding and non-binding constraints on the Internet Service Providers themselves, who frequently voluntarily help monitor and regulate what they allow to be distributed.



Walzer’s continuum of different types of globalized international relations can provide valuable categories for thinking about globalization and can provide a focal point for discussion and production of ideas. There are various competing ideas for how the globalized world will best work together and some of these fit into Walzer’s paradigm. The classificatory scheme that he provides can serve as a foundation for thinking about unification versus anarchy. Ideologies such as Cosmopolitanism and Republicanism each have a voice that can speak to the issues that Walzer raises, and vice versa.

Walzer’s ideas about complex equality that he lays out inSpheres of Justiceare also useful tools. They can help us think more specifically about just distributions of goods and services and how such distributions might best be attained. His proposal for limiting domination by reducing the interconvertability of goods and services between the various spheres of human social world provide important ways of thinking about how those goods and services might be distributed in the most just manner. It seems that Walzer’s ideas can be applied to the international arena to produce fruitful proposals for international justice.

All of this feeds into the discussion of GPG’s that seems to be an important conceptual step in helping distribute goods and services from one place to another on an international scale. Sandler provides examples of methods (technologies) that states might use to provide these goods (summation, best-shot, weakest-link and weighted sum) and some problems and strengths of each. Knill and Lehmkuhl provide us with models of how state and non-state actors might work together to provide a just distribution of goods and services, without destroying the authority and the importance of the state, as Walzer and the Republicans fear.

In attempting to tie together these varying sets of ideas, it is important to come back to the central point that Walzer wants to achieve, which is justice. His methods of getting us there on the international scale seem to need supplementation in order to be achieved. The purpose of this paper was to explore how concepts that ground our understanding of the contemporary international arena can help us apply Walzer’s ideas in a global perspective. To supplement that purpose, we explored practical methods that are already in use that can support a Walzerian paradigm of distributive justice, primarily in the form of Global Public Goods.

Each of the authors above seek, in the larger context of justice, to give voice to the needy and oppressed, and to establish methods of providing autonomy and self-determination to those people who cannot obtain it for themselves. Those two issues are two of the broader human issues involved in justice, beyond the obvious issue of survivability. Kaul brings us back to these more abstract goals, a point that most of the authors above do not explicitly use to ground their work, but is often discerned in the background:

The right of all people to have a say in matters that affect their lives is a widely recognized basic principle of democracy and equity. So, for both equity and efficiency reasons, it is important to search for ways of making political decision-making on global public goods more inclusive and more public. The challenge is to align the circles of those to be consulted (or to take part in the decision-making) with the spillover range of the good under negotiation.[97]

Kaul’s concern highlights the need for individuals to whom goods and services will be distributed to meet their needs, and the individuals from whom resources will be provided, to each have a voice in helping make the various methods of distributing GPG’s a just and fair process as well as having a just and fair outcome. So both actors—those who receive GPG’s and those who provide the resources for the GPG’s, must be involved in the process and come to some form of just resolution that allows for the proliferation of the classical liberal ideals of autonomy and self-determination, as well as more the practical issues of survivability and quality of life. So in the face of a rapidly changing international ecology, it has been shown that Walzerian ideas of justice and globalization can be applied, at least in part, by refining and implementing GPG’s to distribute goods and services globally, in a way that will be mutually beneficial to all actors, as well as increase fundamental, though more abstract human needs, such as autonomy and self-determination.


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[1] Michael Walzer,Spheres of Justice(New York: Basic Books, Inc, 1983).

[2] WalzerSpheres, 16-17.

[3] Ibid. 17-20.

[4] Ibid.,88-90.

[5] Ibid.,31.

[6] Ibid., 63.

[7] Ibid., 31.

[8] Ibid., 39.

[9] Ibid., 35-42.

[10] Ibid., 39.

[11] Veit Bader, “Citizenship and Exclusion: Radical Democracy, Community, and Justice. Or, what is Wrong with Communitarianism?”Political Theory23 (1995): 218.

[12] WalzerSpheres, 42-46.

[13] Ulrich K Preuss, “Migration—A Challenge to Modern Citizenship,”Constellations4 (1998): 308.

[14] Simone Weil,The Need for Roots(London: Routledge Classics Trans 1952, Arthur Wills, 1949), 127.

[15] John Williams, “Hannah Arendt and the International Space In-Between,” International Studies Association Conference: New Orleans, 2002 <http://www.isanet.org/noarchive/williams2.html> (accessed December 2003).

[16] James Bohman, “Cosmopolitan Republicanism: Citizenship, Freedom and Global Political Authority,”Monist84 (2001): 15; Bader, “Citizenship and Exclusion,” 214.

[17] Michael Walzer,Just and Unjust Wars(New York: Basic Books, Inc, 1977).

[18] Ibid., 54-55.

[19] Walzer,Spheres, 41-43.

[20] Walzer,Spheres, 43 and 78.

[21] Ibid., 33-34.

[22] Ibid., 64.

[23] Bryan S Turner, “The Erosion of Citizenship,”British Journal of Sociology52 (2001): 189–90.

[24] Turner notes that the family entitlements of the social component citizenship obviously give preference to the “traditional” family, especially heterosexual married couples. Both the church and state claimed a vested interest in sexual conduct and gave preferential treatment to those reproducing citizens who followed the religious and civic norms for sexual behavior. Ibid, 193.

[25] Turner notes that due to shifting economic factors, many fewer citizens are defined by their careers and career-based class distinctions are much weaker than they were fifty years ago. Another change is the apparent end of mass warfare, including increasing decolonization, all reduce the need for the military and thus the entitlements due to the soldier-citizen. Finally, reproductive technologies, gender changes in work patterns, feminist analysis of the family, as well as “alternative” families all contribute to the erosion of reproduction as a social entitlement. Ibid., 194-98.

[26] Ibid, 204.

[27] Land rights and compensation to disenfranchised natives who preceded colonialists.

[28] “Cultural rights to language, to a share in the cultural heritage of a community, and to religious identity.” Ibid., 206.

[29] Omar Dahbour, 1996-97 “Introduction: National Identity as a Philosophical Problem,”The Philosophical Forum28 (1996-97): 10.

[30] Ibid., 11.

[31] Ibid., 33.

[32] Ibid., 78.

[33] Ibid., 33-34.

[34] Ibid., 46-51.

[35] Ibid., 41-43.

[36] Michael Walzer, “International Society: What is the Best We Can Do?”Ethical Perspectives6 (1999):205.

[37] Ibid., 201-202.

[38] Ibid., 205.

[39] Ibid., 208.

[40] Kant’s vision of a globalized society is described inPerpetual Peace, a project which, according to Zolo (431), Habermas claims “should be taken up and radicalized. The project for a ‘League of peoples’ uniting sovereign states with each other should be translated into the cosmopolitan project for a ‘state of peoples’ that limits and ultimately fully absorbs the sovereignty of the nation states’.”

[41] Danilo Zolo, “A Cosmopolitan Philosophy of International Law? A Realist Approach,”Ratio Juris12 (2001), no 4:431

[42] Veit Bader, “The Cultural Conditions of Transnational Citizenship: On the Interpenetration of Political and Ethnic Cultures,”Political Theory25 (1997): 773.

[43] Bader, “Citizenship and Exclusion,” 215.

[44] Ronald Beiner, “Community Versus Citizenship: Macintyre’s Revolt against the Modern State,”Critical Review14 (2000): 464.

[45] Bohman, 9.

[46] Charles R Beitz, “Justice and International Relations,”Philosophy and Public Affairs4 (1975): 373-74.

[47] Ibid., 374.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Zolo, 435.

[50] Michael Walzer,Thick and Thin(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 67-69.

[51] David N Luban, “The Romance of the Nation-State,”Philosophy and Public Affairs9 (1980): 393.

[52] Nathan Van Dusen, “Understanding Sovereignty: Bringing Ethics Back in,” International Studies Association Conference: Portland, 2003 <http://www.isanet.org/portlandarchive/understanding%20sovereignty.doc> (accessed December 2003), 5.

[53] Walzer, “International Society,” 201.

[54] Ibid., 202.

[55] Ibid., 203.

[56] Ibid., 204.

[57] Ibid., 203.

[58] Rainer Baubock, “Multilevel Citizenship and Territorial Borders in the EU Polity,”IWE Working Paper SeriesNo : 37, January <http://www.iwe.oeaw.ac.at/workingpapers/wp37.pdf> (accessed December 2003), 1. 

[59] Bader, “Citizenship and Exclusion,” 212.

[60] Bohman, 23.

[61] Ibid., 22.

[62] Baubock, 1.

[63] Chris Brown, “International Relations Theory and the Ethics of Redistribution,”Contemporary Political Studies: Conference Proceedings 1995: 793.

[64] Bohman, 5.

[65] Inge Kaul,Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization(New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2003), 2.

[66] During the 1990’s, international investors attempted to create markets in Southeast Asia. As those countries tied their currency to the American dollar and raised domestic interest rates, foreign investment grew dramatically and resulted in a flooded stock and real estate market.

However, by 1997, those investors realized that prices had become inflated much beyond their actual value. They panicked and withdrew a total of $105 billion from these countries, forcing governments in the region to abandon their dollar peg. Unable to halt the ensuing free fall of their currencies, those governments used up their entire foreign exchangers reserves. As a result, economic output fell, unemployment increased, and wages plummeted. Foreign banks and creditors reacted by declining new credit applications and refusing to extend existing loans. By late 1997, the entire region found itself in the throes of a financial crisis that threatened to push the global economy into recession. (Steger, 47)

[67] Michael Faust,Global Public Goods: Taking the Concept Forward(New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2001), 29.

[68] Kaul,Managing Globalization, 23.

[69] Faust, 39.

[70] Kaul,Managing Globalization, 3.

[71] Ibid., 188-189.

[72] Michael Walzer,On Toleration(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 52-83.

[73] Walzer,Thick and Thin, 67.

[74] Ibid., 68.

[75] Joseph Stiglitz,Globalization and Its Discontents(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003), 25.

[76] Manfred Steger,Globalization: A Very Short Introduction(New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 42. 

[77] Stiglitz.

[78] Faust, 4.

[79] The prisoner’s dilemma is a classical feature of game theory. Assume there are two prisoners arrested under the suspicion of having committed a crime together. Each has separately been given the same deal and neither knows what the other prisoner is doing. If one confesses (defects) while the other maintains innocence (cooperates), the first will go free, while the other will get the maximum sentence. If both maintain their innocence (cooperate), they will each receive a minimum sentence. If both confess (defect), they will both receive moderate sentences.

[80] Ibid., 5.

[81] Ibid.

[82] Todd Sandler, "On Financing Global and International Public Goods " in Marco Ferroni and Ahoka Mody (eds )International Public Goods: Incentives, Measurement, and Financing(Dordecht, NL: Kluwer, 2002), 16.

[83] Ibid., 18.

[84] Ibid., 20.

[85] Ibid., 22.

[86] Todd Sandler and Daniel Arce, “A Conceptual Framework for Understanding Global and Transnational Public Goods for Health¸”Fiscal Studies23 (June 2002): 207.

[87] Sandler, “On Financing Global”, 25.

[88] Inge Kaul,Providing Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21stCentury(New York: United Nations Development Programme, 1999), 55.

[89] “…Coase argued that the presence of externalities alone does not necessarily prevent effective coordination among independent states. Under certain conditions, declared Coase, bargaining among these actors could lead to solutions that are Pareto-optimal regardless of the rules of legal liability” (Keohane, 85). In other words, and adding some detail, the Coasian position is that if transaction costs could be held at zero (which of course they can’t, a conclusion that Coase himself admits), well-defined property rights, and equal access to information, the results of transactions and infractions will be economically Pareto-optimal to both parties.

[90] Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 87.

[91] Kaul,International Cooperation, 55.

[92] Return to Jeramy's Homepage

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